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Abstract 
Distributed electrical propulsion for aircraft, also known as turbo-
electric distributed propulsion (TeDP), will require a complex 
electrical power system which can deliver power to multiple 
propulsor motors from gas turbine driven generators.  To ensure that 
high enough power densities are reached, it has been proposed that 
such power systems are superconducting.  Key to the development of 
these systems is the understanding of how faults propagate in the 
network, which enables possible protection strategies to be 
considered and following that, the development of an appropriate 
protection strategy to enable a robust electrical power system with 
fault ride-through capability.  This paper investigates possible DC 
protection strategies for a radial DC architecture for a TeDP power 
system, in terms of their ability to respond appropriately to a DC fault 
and their impact on overall system weight and efficiency. This latter 
aspect has already been shown to be critical to shaping the overall 
TeDP concept competitiveness. 
Introduction 
There is strong motivation to develop future aircraft which have 
lower emissions and higher performance than current state of the art 
aircraft, in order to meet the expected future demand for air travel 
and mimimise the environmental impact of such aircraft [1, 2].  TeDP 
has been proposed as a possible solution to enable such targets to be 
reached, with NASA aiming to reach a technology readiness level of 
4-6 by 2025 [3]. 
However, TeDP represents a radical change from current state of the 
art aero-electrical systems. Firstly these electrical power systems are 
much more complex and require a much higher level of onboard 
generation. For a 300pax aircraft, an estimated 50MW of generated 
power capacity is required [4], compared to 1.5MW on an equivalent 
state of the art more-electric aircraft [5]. Secondly, due to the 
increase in the size of the aero-electrical power system, it has been 
proposed that superconducting electrical machines are used, in order 
that high enough power densities can be achieved [6].  In order to 
avoid heat sink penalties, it is proposed that the entire system be 
superconducting, as far as is technologically possible [4]. However, a 
superconducting system requires a cryogenic cooling system, which 
attracts a significant weight and efficiency penalty [4, 7]. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Example TeDP architecture with DC transmission and distribution 
network shown without any protection system present. 
An example distributed electrical propulsion architecture is shown in 
Fig. 1[Error! Reference source not found.].   The generated power 
from the generators and the power input to the propulsor motors will 
be 3-phase AC power.  However the transmission and distribution 
system within this architecture has been chosen to be DC.  This has 
two key advantages.  Firstly it enables the electrical decoupling of the 
high speed generators from the lower speed, higher torque propulsor 
motors.  It is proposed that in order to achieve high propulsive 
efficiency, the gas turbine core driven generators should be run at a 
high shaft speed [6, 9].  Secondly it is proposed that energy storage 
be included in the system.  Whilst the role of the energy storage has 
yet to be fully defined, and is outside the scope of this paper, it is 
expected that it will provide voltage support to the system in response 
to system transients.  In order to control the contribution of the 
energy storage to the network, it is proposed that it will be interfaced 
to the network via a converter [4].  If the network is DC, then it may 
be possible to use a simpler, and hence lighter and more efficient, 
converter than if an AC-DC converter is used.   
A further advantage of a DC transmission and distribution system is 
the negligible resistance of a DC superconducting network [10].  This 
results in lower losses compared to AC distribution systems.  
However, as has been shown in past publications by the authors, the 
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impact of cable weight and losses on the overall system performance 
is negligible compared to that of the solid state switching components 
[7]. 
Key to the safe operation of the system is the development of an 
appropriate protection and fault management strategy, which will at 
the very least enable an aircraft to continue to fly and land safely 
should an electrical fault occur.  This paper will firstly discuss the 
requirements of the DC protection system for the example TeDP 
network shown in Fig. 1.   Secondly a transient simulation based case 
study to investigate the propagation of faults in a section of the DC 
network is presented and the implications for protection discussed.  
As part of these discussions, the impact of possible protection 
solutions on the weight and efficiency of the full electrical power 
system are considered using a pre-design sensitivity analysis tool 
developed by the authors [7]. 
Considerations for the development of DC 
protection for TeDP network 
Central role of protection system in an aero-electrical 
power system 
Aero-electrical systems require an adequate protection system to 
ensure that the occurrence of an electrical fault does not present a 
safety risk to the aircraft and its occupants, and ultimately to enable 
the aircraft to continue in flight and land safely afterwards.  
Appropriate power quality standards for TeDP aircraft however have 
yet to be developed [11].  To develop an understanding for what 
performance requirements may be expected from a TeDP aircraft in 
the event of an engine out or loss of propulsor scenario, current FAA 
and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Extended Operations 
(ETOPS) regulations are considered [12, 13].  The standards stipulate 
the performance requirements of a remaining, healthy engine if the 
other engine on a twin engine aircraft has failed.  The aircraft must be 
able to safely fly for a certain amount of time on a single engine and 
land safely.  There must be sufficient power (electrical, hydraulic and 
pneumatic) available to enable this.  The most recently developed 
state-of-the-art aircraft have an ETOPS range of up to 370 minutes 
[14]. It is expected that similar standards will be developed for TeDP 
aircraft in order that the aircraft is able to cope with an engine out 
scenario.   
Therefore the proposed components which make up the TeDP 
electrical network have been overrated to enable single engine 
operation in case of an engine out scenario [4].  The maximum power 
required by the example system is 22.4MW for a rolling take-off 
[15].  Under this scenario, each of the 16 propulsor motors will draw 
circa 1.4MW.  To allow for an engine out scenario the generators are 
rated at 12.5MW.  In addition, the propulsor motors are rated at 
2.5MW to allow for scenarios where only 14 out of the 16 propulsor 
motors are operational. The candidate TeDP network in Fig. 1 is 
comprised of 4 identical sub-networks, with 4 generators each 
powering 4 propulsor motors. There are contactors, which are 
nominally open, between the 4 sub-networks to allow re-routing of 
power from one sub-network to another in the case of a fault.  
Parallel cables and feeders are also utilised (not shown in the 
diagram) to provide additional redundancy [4]. 
Howev
er in 
additio
n to 
this 
overrat
ing, a 
suitabl
e 
protect
ion and 
fault 
management strategy is required to isolate electrical faults, prevent 
fault propagation and protect healthy sections of the TeDP network in 
the event of a fault. Ideally, a protection and fault management 
system should also allow for an aero-electrical system to have fault  
Figure 2: interdependencies between the three key areas of power system 
design and collective impact on system weight and efficiency. 
ride-through capability, enabling a system to recover from a fault 
after it has cleared, and protect the non-faulted system when a fault 
occurs.   
The choice of protection system will be influenced by the choice of 
network architecture (whether it is ring, radial or meshed radial for 
example) [16].  The choice of converters utilised for the generator 
interfaces will impact on the fault response of the system.  If 
conventional voltage source converters (VSCs) are used then a short 
circuit fault will, in the absence of any suitable protection system, 
cause the filter capacitors to discharge, resulting in a high peak fault 
current [17].   
Therefore the design of a protection system for a distributed electrical 
propulsion system both influences, and is influenced by,  the power 
system architecture and approaches taken to provide redundancy and 
reliability in power system design. As Fig. 2 illustrates, a holistic 
view to the design of the full power system must be taken in order to 
develop a system which meets weight and efficiency (and hence fuel 
burn) targets [7].   
Sensitivity of fault response of system to network 
parameters 
To development a suitable protection system, the fault response of a 
superconducting electrical power system must first be considered.  
This is dependent on a number of factors which include both 
parameters specific to the choice of cable (resistivity, cross-sectional 
area), and operating conditions (voltage level, length of cable) [18].   
If the current in a superconducting cable exceeds a critical current 
level, Ic (A), defined in (1) then the resistance of the cable will start 
to rise at a rate of kquench, until the quenched resistance (Rquenched), 
defined in equation (2) is reached [18].  Once this occurs, the 
resistance of the cable continues to rise at a rate of kcreep due to 
increased heat dissipation as quenching occurs. ܫ௖  ൌ ܬ௖ ൈ ܽ௖௔௕௟௘        (1)                             ܴ௤௨௘௡௖௛௘ௗ  ൌ ሺఘೌ೘್೔೐೙೟ൈ௔೎ೌ್೗೐ሻ௟೎ೌ್೗೐         (2)                             
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Jc is the critical current density of the cable (A/m2) and acable is its 
cross-sectional area (m2). ȡambient is the resistivity of the 
superconducting material at the ambient temperature of the system 
.LQWKLVFDVHȝȍPDQGlcable is the length of the cable (m). 
The peak magnitude of fault current, and hence the likelihood that a 
cable will quench, has been shown in [18] to be most sensitive to the 
cable diameter and length.   The physical size of the proposed TeDP 
aircraft is such that if the generators are located within wingtip 
mounted gas turbines, then there may be 40m between the generators 
and the propulsor motors [8].   Hence, when considering the 
propagation of a fault in a network, it is important to consider that the 
length of the cable will impact on the peak fault current, and whether 
quenching is likely to occur.  However, the studies presented in [18] 
did not consider how a fault would propagate through a TeDP DC 
network.  This will be investigated in this paper. 
Consideration of protection options 
Minimum requirements of a protection system 
A protection system must ensure that any electrical fault which 
occurs on the network does not impact on the safety of the aircraft.  
For an aero-electrical system this means that in the event of an 
electrical fault occurring, firstly the aircraft must be able to land 
safely. In addition to this, protection must prevent fire and the 
possibility of sections of the aircraft becoming live in a fault scenario 
[19].   
In order to achieve this, the protection system must reliably trip when 
a fault occurs, and it must trip fast enough to ensure that a fault can 
be isolated. Additionally the protection system should be as simple as 
possible, in order to ensure the reliability of the protection system.  
Further to this, for an aerospace application where weight and 
efficiency require to be kept to a minimum, a simpler protection 
system may also be lighter and more efficient. Hence it will have less 
of a negative impact on fuel burn. For compact electrical networks, 
such as those proposed for distributed propulsion systems, high levels 
of selectivity may be required in order to maintain supply to critical 
loads [Error! Reference source not found.].  
For aero-electrical applications, the weight of the protection system 
will impact on system performance (fuel burn) [17], hence there is 
motivation to optimize the protection system towards this objective in 
addition to providing an adequate level of systems safety.  For a 
superconducting electrical network, the impact of a protection system 
on WKHQHWZRUN¶V efficiency must also be considered.  This is because 
losses will be dissipated as heat, which is subsequently removed from 
the system via a cryocooling system. Hence a lower efficiency will 
result in an increase in the required rating of the associated 
cryocooling system, increasing the total system weight and 
decreasing system efficiency [7]. Ultimately this will have a 
significant negative impact on system performance by increasing fuel 
burn, could potentially account for over 1/3 of the system weight and 
losses [4,7].  The size and power of the required cryocooling system 
can be estimated using equations (3) to (5) [20]. 
௖ܲ௥௬௢  ൌ ொሶఎ೎ೌೝ೙೚೟ ሺ்ೌ೘್ି்೎೚೚೗ሻ்೎೚೚೗      (3) 
௖ܹ௥௬௢  ൌ ݇ ൈ ௖ܲ௥௬௢      (4) 
ߟ௙௨௟௟  ൌ ௉೘೚೟೚ೝ௉೘೚೟೚ೝା௉೎ೝ೤೚ା௉೐೗೐೎೗೚ೞೞ೐ೞ    (5) 
 
Pcryo is the power required by a cryocooler (W) which is operating at 
a Carnot efficiency, Șcarnot, (taken to be 30%) with an ambient 
temperature, Tamb ,(300K) and a coolant temperature,Tcool, (100K for 
the solid state switching components, 77K for superconducting 
components) and ሶܳ  is the heat flow to the coolant (W). Wcryo is the 
weight of the cryocooler, with a power density k of 3kW/kg.  Șfull is 
the full system efficiency, which is a function of the total power 
demanded by the motors, Pmotor, the cryocooler power requirements 
Pcryo and the electrical losses in the system Pelec_losses. 
The weight and efficiency targets set for aero-electrical applications 
potentially discourage over-protecting the network.  Hence for a 
distributed electrical propulsion system, there is a need to firstly 
consider what the fault response of the network is.  Secondly to then 
consider protection options and how they will respond to a fault.  
Thirdly to investigate what impact the candidate protection options 
would have on system weight and efficiency. 
Protection hardware options 
If no protection is in place, then it is expected that the network will 
quench in response to the fault if the fault current is higher than the 
critical current for the cables.  If the system does quench then this 
will lead to questions regarding how much of the system will quench, 
how quickly it will recover from a quench and how the system is 
reconfigured during a quench event in order to ensure the safety of 
the aircraft.  If a quench does occur then this may also result in 
damage to equipment due to local heating associated with the quench.   
However, an alternative approach is to actively respond to a fault in a 
timely manner in order to prevent quenching occurring.  This is 
achieved by implementing a suitable protection system.  Firstly the 
converter could be designed to provide fault current blocking 
capability [8].  This can be achieved in two ways:   Either a voltage 
source converter with snubbers on the DC side capacitance to limit 
the di/dt [19], or to take advantage of the fault current blocking 
capability of a current source converter [8].  However, whilst these 
converters will block fault current from propagating to other sections 
of the network, the faulted section of network may still quench if 
there is enough source current to create a local overcurrent condition 
at the point of the fault [18]. 
If it is found that the isolating properties of appropriate converter 
topologies are not sufficient to ensure a safe and sufficiently robust 
system with fault ride-through capability, then additional protection 
will need to be considered.  This could either be using 
superconducting fault current limiters (SFCLs) to suppress fault 
currents, or solid state circuit breakers (SSCBs) to quickly isolate a 
fault before the fault current can fully develop [8]. Therefore, despite 
the high switching losses of SSCBs (resulting in a heavier 
cryocooling system) [4, 7], they continue to be considered for 
protection strategies for distributed electrical propulsion systems. 
SFCLs do not respond as quickly as SSCBs, but they are a robust, 
lightweight technology.  Therefore, despite the time of response of an 
SFCL to a fault being in the order of milliseconds (compared to 
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microseconds for an SSCB), SFLCs are still considered for 
distributed electrical propulsion systems.  
Fault response of a section of DC TeDP network 
Fault response of the system 
Before the suitability of different protection strategies can be 
assessed, the fault response of the system must first be characterized.  
A section of a TeDP network is modelled as shown in Fig. 3 which 
represents four propulsors (Rload1-4) connected to the output of one 
voltage source converter (VSC).  The cables are represented by an 
inductance (Ltransmission, Ldistribution1-4) in series with a variable 
resistance (Rtransmission, Rdistribution1-4 ZKLFK LV  ȍ XQGHU QRUPDO
operating conditions.  The quench behaviour of the cables has been 
described previously in equations (1) and (2).  A rail to rail short 
circuit (Rfault) is also placed across one of the four distribution cables 
after 1 ms of simulation time, leading to the discharge of the filter 
capacitor CF.  Table 1 shows the network parameters used for this 
and subsequent simulation studies.   
Fig. 4 shows the network voltage (VCF(t)) and the transmission cable 
current when no protection is modeled in the system. It can be seen 
the network voltage collapses from 12 kV to near-zero and the 
current carried in the transmission cable increases significantly from 
$UHDFKLQJDSHDNRIN$ȝVDIWHUWKHIDXOWFigs. 5 
and 6 show the currents carried in each of the transmission and 
distribution cables before and after the fault. From these figures, it 
can be seen that the current in the transmission cable and the faulted 
distribution cable rises, whilst the current in the distribution cables of 
the healthy network branches falls to zero.  This rise in fault current 
causes both the faulted distribution cable and the transmission cable 
to quench, as their critical currents are both exceeded. To illustrate 
this effect, fig. 7 shows the critical current ratings for both cables 
overlaid on traces of the measured currents during the fault event, 
illustrating the instances of quench initiation. From this figure, it can 
be seen from fig. 7 that the faulted distribution cable quenches 0.22 
ȝV DIWHU WKH IDXOW DQG WKH WUDQVPLVVLRQ FDEOHTXHQFKHVȝV DIWHU
the fault. 
 
Figure 3: Subsection of DC network for examining the response to a fault on 
the DC distribution system. 
Table 1. Simulation parameters 
Rail to rail network voltage 12 kV  
Propulsor motor rating 1.4 MW 
Transmission cable length 20 m 
Transmission cable nominal current 466.67 A 
Transmission cable critical current 1.4 kA 
Distribution cable(s) length 10 m 
Distribution cable(s) nominal current 116.67 A 
Distribution cable(s) critical current 350 A 
 
Figure 4: Fault response of the transmission cable. 
 
Figure 5: Fault currents in the transmission, faulted distribution and healthy 
distribution cables. 
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Figure 6: Fault currents in the transmission, faulted distribution and healthy 
distribution cables at time of fault. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Quench timings of the transmission cable and faulted distribution 
cable. 
Protection system trades 
Identification of protection system strategies 
Three different approaches to protecting the system were 
investigated.  These were firstly to use current-source converters 
(CSC) (illustrated in fig. 8), secondly to use SFCLs (illustrated in 
fig.9) and thirdly to use SSCBs (illustrated in fig.10). 
If CSCs (or indeed other current limiting converter technologies) are 
employed, the need for a filter capacitor is removed, hence the fault 
response is no longer dominated by the capacitor discharge.  Figure 
11 shows the measured current profiles for the transmission cable, 
and faulty and healthy distribution cables. It can be seen that the 
current in the healthy distribution cables falls to nearly zero as a 
result of the collapse in network voltage and the fault current flows 
through the faulted distribution cable.  This causes the faulted cable 
to quench as its critical current is surpassed.  Additionally, as the 
transmission cable sees no significant change in current it remains 
unquenched. Interestingly, even after the faulted distribution cable 
has quenched, it continues to draw significantly more current than the 
remaining healthy branches. In this particular case, although the 
quenched cable has increased significantly in impedance, the total 
fault path impedance is still notably lower than the effective 
impedance of the motor loads supplied by the remaining healthy 
branches.  Hence the fault still draws the majority of the current from 
the source, depriving the remaining motor loads of their supply 
(although this ratio of quenched fault path impedance and remaining 
load impedance is highly sensitive to the architecture design and 
voltage level). The use of additional contactors would be required 
here to physically isolate the faulted section of the network and 
restore the power supply to the remaining propulsion motors.  The 
required operating time of these contactors would be shaped by the 
maximum permissible supply interruption period for the motors 
before a noticeable reduction in thrust occurs.   
The second protection strategy considered is the employment of 
SFCLs to limit the fault current and avoid the quenching of both the 
transmission and distribution cables.  In order to ensure that neither 
cable will quench, a SFCL is placed on the distribution branch, which 
is rated to quench when the current reaches two thirds of the 
GLVWULEXWLRQ FDEOH¶V FULWLFDO FXUUHQW  7KH 6)&/ PXst limit the fault 
FXUUHQWEHORZ WKHGLVWULEXWLRQFDEOH¶VFULWLFDO FXUUHQWZLWKLQȝV
of the fault occurrence; hence the quench rate of the SFCL is set to a 
very high arbitrary value of 1x109ȍV Fig. 12 shows the fault 
response in each of the cables in the network.  The SFCL quenches 
 ȝV DIWHU WKH IDXOW DQG UHGXFHV WKH IDXOW FXUUHQWV LQ WKH IDXOWHG
distribution cable and the transmission cable to approximately 240A 
and 590 A respectively.  Therefore, neither cable quenches.  
The third and final protection strategy considered is the use of SSCBs 
to interrupt the fault before the faulted distribution cable quenches. It 
has been shown previously that the faulted distribution cable will 
TXHQFK  ȝV DIWHr the fault occurs, therefore in this study it is 
assumed that the fault can be detected and the SSCB will operate 
x This is a post print copy of a paper accepted and published at the 2015 SAE Aerotech Congress and Exhibition, and as such is subject to SAE 
copyright. DOI: 10.4271/2015-01-2404 
Page 6 of 10 
 
within this time.  In this case the SSCB is rated to trip when the fault 
current reaches twice the nominal current of the distribution cable.  
Fig. 13 VKRZV WKDW QRQHRI WKH FDEOHV¶ FULWLFDO FXUUHQWV DUH UHDFKHG 
and as a result do not quench.   
 
Figure 8: CSC protection strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 
9: 
SFCL 
protecti
on 
strategy 
Figure 10: SSCB protection strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Fault response with CSC 
 
Figure 12: Fault response with SFCLs 
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Figure 13: Fault response with SSCBs 
 
 
 
 
 
Trades between protection strategies and system 
performance 
Different protection system approaches will have different impacts on 
system weight and efficiency, and hence system performance.  
Investigation of the fault response of the AC sections of network is 
outside the scope of this paper, however to investigate the impact of 
different protection strategies on performance, the full system 
architecture shown in fig. 1 is considered.  Hence a notional AC 
protection system has been included, with SSCBs and SFCLs 
included to protect the converters and electrical machines from any 
AC side faults.  
Table 2 shows the total weight and losses of the combined electrical 
and cryocooling systems for the three protection options presented in 
the previous section.  It can be observed that the impact of the SFCL 
on the system weight and efficiency is very low.  The SSCBs have a 
much greater impact, accounting for 4.79% of the total weight of the 
electrical and cryocooling, and just under 5% of the total losses.  
Figs. 14 and 15 show the results of a DC voltage sweep for the 
different protection options considered, for the total system weight 
(fig. 14) and system losses (fig. 15).  The results for the CSC only 
and SFCL DC protection are almost identical due to the limited 
impact of the SFCLs on system performance.  These results indicate 
that the optimal operating voltage of the system is circa +/- 4 kV to 
+/- 6 kV. All of these results include the weight and power 
requirements of the cryocooling system.  Finally the results indicate 
the considerable impact that the full protection system (considering 
the AC and DC protection systems) has on system performance.    
Table 2. Contribution of different components to the total weight and losses of 
the combined electrical and cryocooling system at +/-6kV DC voltage. 
 % Total weight % Total losses 
 
Case  (CSC) 
 
Case 2 
(SFCL) 
Case 3 
(SSCB) 
Case 1  
(CSC) 
 
Case 2 
(SFCL) 
Case 3 
(SSCB) 
Converters 72.86 72.86 69.38 76.62 76.62 72.79 
AC protection 18.8 18.8 17.90 20.21 20.21 19.20 
DC protection - 0.0003 4.79 - 9x10-6 4.98 
Electrical 
Machines 5.74 5.74 5.46 1.86 1.86 1.79 
SMES 2.36 2.36 2.25 1.25 1.25 1.19 
Cables 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.05 0.05 0.04 
 
Discussion 
It is clear from the results presented that some form of protection 
system is required to protect healthy sections of the network and 
prevent the propagation of a fault through the wider TeDP electrical 
network.  In particular, if quenching is to be avoided, then the 
protection system must be able to react in under 22 µs to a fault on a 
DC distribution feeder.  There is a longer time window of around 
1.5ms, before the DC transmission cable will quench.  In addition to 
the faulted cable quenching, the current to the healthy feeders will be 
significantly reduced for either a quenched transmission cable or a 
quenched distribution cable (unless the fault path impedance of the 
faulted distribution cable is significantly higher than the effective  
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Figure 14: Comparison of total system weight (combined electrical and 
cryocooler system) for the different protection strategies. (Red is for case 1 
(CSC) and 2 (SFCL), blue is for case 3 (SSCB)). 
 
Figure 15: Comparison of total system (combined electrical and cryocooler 
system) losses for the different protection strategies. (Red is for case 1 (CSC) 
and 2 (SFCL), blue is for case 3 (SSCB)). 
impedance of the remaining loads).  Under these conditions, a single 
electrical fault could result in the loss of thrust from all propulsors in 
that particular section of the network. 
The results presented in this paper indicate that the use of CSCs as 
the sole protection for the DC transmission and distribution network 
on a TeDP architecture is very challenging if quenching is to be 
avoided.  As a result, whilst utilizing CSCs as a protection system 
component in addition to their primary power conversion role 
minimizes the impact of the protection system on the aircraft 
performance (i.e. negligible additional mass and efficiency penalties), 
additional contactors are still likely to be required for physical fault 
isolation following the quenching of the faulted cable in order to 
restore the supply of power to nearby the healthy feeders. 
Results presented in this paper indicate that appropriately rated 
SFCLs and SSCBs may be possible DC protection options. When 
either SFCLs or SSCBs are used to protect the system, the results 
indicate that the healthy sections of the distribution network continue 
to operate as normal (with minimal transient behavior) after the fault 
has occurred and the protection has operated.  The performance of the 
SFCL does prevent the faulted cable from quenching, although the 
current drawn by the faulted branch does increase by 40%, which 
may require components to be overrated to be able to withstand 
higher currents during a faulted condition.  This will impact on 
system weight and efficiency, and has not been considered in the 
results presented in Table 2 or figs. 13 and 14. Further studies are 
required to ascertain what level of overrating of components would 
be required to accommodate for these conditions and whether, like 
with the CSC, additional isolating contactors would be required for 
physical isolation. The approach using SSCBs has a much greater 
impact on system performance, contributing around 5% to the total 
system weight and losses.  However the advantage of the SSCB is 
that it isolates the faulted branch completely.  Therefore no extra 
current is drawn from the generator fed rectifier.    
The results presented in Table 2 also show the significant impact that 
the full protection system (for both the AC and DC sections of the 
TeDP power system architecture) has on the overall system 
performance.  This firstly indicates the importance of developing a 
protection system for future TeDP aircraft which is optimized for 
safety, mass and efficiency.  Secondly it indicates the importance of 
the protection system in the holistic design process of a TeDP 
electrical power system. Its impact is not insignificant and it must be 
considered from an early stage, alongside redundancy and 
architecture options.  Finally, this paper has not considered the 
impact that future improvements to the performance of SSCBs, in 
particular if the losses from these devices could be reduced.  The 
losses contribute significantly to the cryocooler requirements, 
impacting negatively on weight and efficiency [7].  If the 
performance of these devices changes significantly, it may impact on 
decisions surrounding choice of protection system. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
A key enabler to the development of a TeDP system that has a DC 
transmission and distribution system is the development of a suitable 
protection strategy.  It is clear that firstly a decision about whether it 
is acceptable for a faulted superconducting cable to quench in 
response to a fault must be made.  It can be concluded from the study 
presented that for the architecture considered, that if one DC 
distribution branch cable quenches, then as a result, reduced current 
could be supplied to the remaining 3 propulsor motors in that section 
of network until the fault is physically isolated from the network by 
some other means.  
Therefore a protection strategy to prevent quenching occurring and 
enabling the TeDP DC architecture to have fault ride through 
capability is required.  This will use either SFCLs, or SSCBs, or a 
combination thereof is required.  CSCs or other current limiting 
converter topologies may also be important for limiting fault current 
at the source. SSCBs, if available at the required ratings in 2035, 
provide the most comprehensive protection solution, but at the 
greatest cost to system weight and efficiency. Using the SSCBs as a 
multirole protection and control device (in a manner akin to present-
day SSPCs [23]) may potentially make these costs more acceptable 
from a holistic design point of view however. 
In order to develop TeDP protection solutions further, there is a need 
to first develop a protection system evaluation framework for TeDP 
power systems.  By combining the output of this capability with 
considerations for system redundancy and performance (weight and 
efficiency), the authors will continue to work towards developing an 
optimum protection strategy to enable safe and robust TeDP power 
systems to be developed. 
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Definitions/Abbreviations 
AC Alternating Current 
CSC Current Source Converter 
DC Direct Current 
SFCL Superconducting Fault 
Current Limiter 
SMES Superconducting  Magnetic 
Energy Storage 
SSCB Solid State Circuit Breaker 
SSPC Solid State Power Controller 
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TeDP Turbo-electric Distributed 
Propulsion 
VSC Voltage Source Converter 
 
